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THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX: POVERTY,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND
LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM
Howard F. Chang*
INTRODUCTION
According to the 2000 Census, the foreign-born population in the
United States reached 31.1 million, representing 11.1% of the total
U.S. population.' This percentage is the highest that the United
States has experienced since 1930, when 11.6% of the total U.S. popu-
lation was foreign born.2 In 1970, the foreign-born population was
only 9.6 million, or only 4.7% of the total population.3 The rapid ex-
pansion of the foreign-born population in the intervening three de-
cades reflects high levels of immigration into the United States, 4
which in turn reflects the liberalization of U.S. immigration laws since
1965. 5 Some observers have reacted to these data with alarm, noting
that the sheer number of immigrants now residing in the United States
is "by far the most ever recorded.' ' 6 The restrictionist Center for Im-
migration Studies (CIS), for example, notes that the foreign-born pop-
ulation grew by 11.3 million between 1990 and 2000, and that "[t]he
foreign-born population's growth rate in every decade since 1970 has
been higher than at any other time in history." 7
The absolute number of immigrants, however, is far less important
than their share of the total U.S. population. Our ability to absorb
immigrants into our society and our labor market depends on the rela-
* Professor of Law. University of Pennsylvania Law School. Copyright © 2003, Howard F.
Chang. I would like to thank symposium participants at the DePaul University College of Law
and session participants at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools for
helpful comments.
1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. U.S. DEP"I OF COMMERCE. CENSUS 2000 PROFiiLE: U.S. SUM-
MAR\ 3 tbl.2 (2002).
2. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. PROFILE OF THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000. at 9 fig.l.] (2001) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU].
3. See id.
4. See id. at 2.
5. See id. at 8-9.
6. SiEVEN A. CAMAROTA. CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED
STATES - 2002. at 4 (2002).
7. Id.
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tive sizes of the native and immigrant populations. Viewed from this
perspective, the number of immigrants in the United States today is
fairly moderate compared to levels experienced during much of our
past. In fact, from 1860 to 1920, the foreign-born population fluctu-
ated between 13.2% and 14.8% of the total U.S. population. 8 This
percentage fell steadily from 1920 to 1970 as a result of restrictive im-
migration legislation enacted in 1921 and 1924, which established the
national origin quota system that remained in place until 1965. 9 From
a historical perspective, it is this period of low immigration and a
shrinking foreign-born share of the U.S. population that represents an
aberration and a departure from our tradition of liberal immigration
laws. The recovery of the foreign-born population from the low point
of 1970 merely reflects a return toward the levels that prevailed over
much of our nation's history.10
Restrictionists, however, are disturbed by not only the quantity of
immigrants in the United States but also their quality. The Census
Bureau reports that according to data from the March 2000 Current
Population Survey, the proportion of the population age twenty-five
and older who had failed to complete high school was higher among
the foreign born (33.0%) than among natives (13.4%).l t The foreign
born from Latin America were especially likely to have less than a
high-school education (50.4%), and 66.2% of those from Mexico had
less than a high-school education. 12 "There is no single better predic-
tor of economic success than education," notes the CIS, "and the fact
that so many adult immigrants lack a high school degree means their
income, poverty rates,.., and other measures of economic attainment
are likely to lag far behind natives."1 3
Not surprisingly, the Census Bureau also found that the foreign
born in the United States have lower earnings as full-time workers
and lower median household incomes than natives. 14 The Census Bu-
reau reports that the poverty rate for the foreign born was 16.8%,
while the poverty rate for natives was 11.2%. 15 Poverty rates were
8. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 2, at 9 fig.1-1.
9. See id. at 8-9.
10. The foreign-born share of the U.S. population is also moderate compared to the corre-
sponding share in other countries of immigration. In 1990. the foreign born represented 17% of
the total population of Canada and 23% of the total population of Australia. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEw AMERICANS: ECONOMIC. DEMOGRAPHIC. AND FISCAl EFFECTS
OF IMMIGRATION 63 tbl.2.11 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997) [hereinafter NRC].
11. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. supra note 2, at 36.
12. See id. at 37.
13. CAMAROTA, supra note 6. at 11.
14. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. supra note 2, at 5-6, 42-45.
15. See id. at 46-47.
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higher still for the foreign born from Latin America (21.9%) and high-
est for those from Mexico (25.8%). 16 In light of such data, restriction-
ists are especially concerned about immigration from Mexico. 17
Furthermore, census data indicate that despite a $3000 increase in
national median household income over the past decade' 8 and a de-
crease in poverty nationwide, 19 median household income fell and
poverty increased in areas in Southern California and in the New
York metropolitan area, with high rates of immigration of the foreign
born.20 Some observers conclude that "something is going wrong."' 2'
Economists and demographers suggest that immigration helps to ex-
plain the patterns observed in these data.22 This suggestion raises the
questions: Should we find these trends troubling? Does it suggest that
immigration is causing poverty? Should we therefore restrict the im-
migration of the poor? Should we reject proposals to make more
visas available for unskilled alien workers?
In this Article, I argue that the immigration of unskilled workers
poses a fundamental problem for liberals. In Part I, I suggest that this
immigration produces benefits for natives in the labor market with
little evidence of adverse effects on native workers. In Part 1I, how-
ever, I turn to concerns about the fiscal burden that poor immigrants
might impose on the public treasury, and I suggest that the optimal
16. See id. it 47 fig. 19-2.
17. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA. CENTFR FOR IMMIORATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION FROM
MEXico: ASSESSING THE IMiACT ON THE UNITED STA-1ES (2001).
18. See Jannv Scott. Census Finds Rising Fide, and Many Who Missed Boat. N.Y. TiMES. June
17, 2002, at B1.
19. See Peter Y. Hong. The U.S. Census; Data Reflects Southland's Highs, Lows. L.A. TiMEs.
June 5, 2002, pt. 2. at 1 (reporting that 13.1% of individuals in the United States lived in poverty
in 1989, whereas 12.4% lived in poverty in 1999): Peter T. Kilborn & Lynette Clemetson. Gains
of 90s Did Not Lift All, Census Shows. N.Y. TiMES. June 5. 2002. at Al (reporting that 10% of
all U.S. families lived in poverty in 1989, whereas 9.2% lived in poverty in 2000).
20. See Sean Gill. California Children Living in Poverty Rose by 4,30,000 in '90s, Survev Shows.
L.A. TIMES. Mar. 8. 2002. pt. A. pt. 1. at 18 (reporting increase in number of California children
living in poverty): Hong. supra note 19, at I (reporting increased poverty in the Los Angeles
area): Peter Y. Hong et al.. Southland's Average Faotily Income Dropped in the '90s. L.A. TiIES.
May 15, 2002. at pt. A, pt. I (reporting rising poverty and falling median income in Los Angeles
County): Daryl Kelley, Ventura Count'; High- Tech Boom Offset by' Rise in Poverty. L.A. TiES.
May 15. 2002, pt. 2. at I (reporting rising poverty in California's Ventura County): Scott Martelle
& Erin Chan, Income Drop in *90s Cut a Broad Swath, Data Show. L.A. TiMES, Aug. 27. 2002, pt.
2, at I (reporting increased poverty and declining median household income in Los Angeles
County): Scott. supra note 18. at BI (reporting a fall in median household income in parts of the
New York metropolitan area and in parts of Southern California): Jannv Scott. Manhattanites
Fared Best in New York City in 1990's, N.Y. TIMES, May 24. 2002, at B4 (reporting rising poverty
and falling median family income in Queens. Brooklyn, and the Bronx).
21. Hong et al.. supra note 20. at I (quoting economist Heather Boushev).
22. See, e.g.. Hong, supra note 19, at 1: Martelle & Chan. supra note 20. at 1: Scott. supra note
18. at BI: Scott. supra note 20. at B4.
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response from the perspective of the economic welfare of natives
would be to admit these aliens as guest workers with limited access to
public benefits. In Part III, I note how this response would violate
liberal egalitarian ideals. These ideals would treat these resident
workers as equals, entitled to access to citizenship and to the full set of
public benefits provided to citizens. In Part IV, I outline how this
liberal stance can produce an anomaly: If the welfare of all incumbent
residents determines admission policies, and we anticipate the fiscal
burden that the immigration of the poor would impose, then our wel-
fare criterion would preclude the admission of unskilled workers in
the first place. Thus, our commitment to treat these workers as equals
once admitted would cut against their admission and make them
worse off than they would be if we agreed never to treat them as
equals. In Part V, I argue that a liberal should avoid this anomaly by
adopting a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to all
individuals, including aliens, which suggests liberal immigration poli-
cies for unskilled workers. Finally, in Part VI, I conclude that the
problem with this escape from the "immigration paradox" is the fail-
ure of most citizens to adopt such a cosmopolitan perspective. As
long as citizens are reluctant to bear the fiscal burdens that cosmopoli-
tan liberalism would impose, constraints of political feasibility may
imply that guest-worker programs are the best policies that cosmopol-
itan liberals can obtain with respect to many unskilled alien workers.
I. THE EFFECTS OF UNSKILLED IMMIGRATION
IN THE LABOR MARKET
One common source of concern is the impact of the immigration of
unskilled workers on the wages and employment opportunities of sim-
ilarly unskilled natives. The CIS, for example, has expressed this con-
cern regarding unskilled immigration from Mexico, claiming that this
immigration has harmed the poorest and most vulnerable native
workers. 23 If immigration reduces the wages of those natives who
must compete with unskilled immigrants in the labor market, then this
effect would produce a more unequal distribution of income among
natives.
Studies of the effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets, how-
ever, have shown little evidence of effects on native wages or employ-
ment. Surveys of this empirical literature indicate that immigration
23. See CAMAROTA, supra note 17, at 21-23. 27-28.
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has a weak effect on the employment of natives. 24 Furthermore, the
evidence indicates a weak relationship between native wages and im-
migration across all types of native workers, white or black, skilled or
unskilled. 25
Why do immigrants have so little adverse impact on the wages and
employment of natives? One reason is that the demand for labor does
not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immigrant
workers not only supply labor, for example, they also demand goods
and services, and this demand will translate into greater demand for
locally supplied labor. This increase in demand can offset the effect of
increased supply.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants and
natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor market. 26 Thus, immi-
grants often do not compete for the same jobs as natives. Indeed,
immigrant labor can be a complement rather than a substitute for na-
tive labor, so that an increase in the supply of immigrant labor will
increase the demand for native labor and thus have positive effects on
native workers rather than negative effects. In fact, labor markets are
highly segregated, with immigrant labor concentrated in some occupa-
tions while natives are concentrated in others.2 7
If immigration has little impact on the wages and employment of
native workers, then why do we observe rising poverty and declining
incomes in areas where the foreign born immigrate? The high rates of
poverty may simply reflect the influx of poor immigrants themselves
and the impact that they have on the composition of the local popula-
tion rather than any adverse impact on the incomes of those already
here. 28 Indeed, the lower levels of skill and education among immi-
grant workers makes it all the less likely that they will serve as good
24. See, e.g.. George J. Borjas. The Economics of Immigration. 32 J. EC ON. Lrr. 1667, 1698
(1994): Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer Hunt. The Impact of Immigrants on Host Countrv
Wages, Employnent and Growth, J. Eco.N. PERSP.. Spring 1995. at 23. 42: NRC. supra note 10. at
223.
25. See, e.g.. Borjas, supra note 24. at 1697: Friedberg & Hunt, supra note 24. at 42: NRC.
supra note 10. at 223.
26. See Jean Baldwin Grossman, The Substitutability of Natives and Imuigrants in Production.
64 REv. ECON. & STAI. 596 (1982).
27. See NRC. supra note 10. at 2t8.
28. See Martelle & Chan. supra note 20, at B1 (quoting demographer Dowell Myers. who
notes that "immigrants came in at the bottom of the ladder" in California, which "worked to
drop average income"); Scott. supra note 18. at BI ("As low-wage workers poured in from
places like Central America in pursuit of a better life, the midpoint on the income spectrum in
some places with large foreign-born populations may have ... inched down."): Scott, supra note
20. at B4 ("While immigrants may have been making more than they did before they came.
many were also making less than manv of the native-born New Yorkers who moved out of the
city in the 1990's.").
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substitutes for native workers and makes it correspondingly less likely
that they will have an adverse impact on native workers.
On the contrary, immigrant workers are likely to benefit natives
through their effects on our labor markets.2 9 Even if wages may fall
for some workers who compete with immigrant labor, this loss for
those workers is a pure transfer: it is offset by an equal gain for those
who employ labor, and ultimately for consumers, who obtain goods
and services at lower cost. 30 Furthermore, we enjoy additional gains
from employing immigrant workers: we gain surplus in excess of what
we pay immigrants for their labor. If we did not gain any surplus from
employing immigrants, we would not hire them. Thus, natives as a
group enjoy a net gain.31
Furthermore, the immigrants themselves gain by immigrating and
obtaining higher wages than they would have enjoyed in their home
countries. 32 Labor migration represents a form of international trade
in which the source country exports labor to the host country.3 3 Like
international trade in goods, labor migration allows foreign suppliers
to sell their services to domestic buyers, allowing both parties to enjoy
gains from trade as a result of the transaction. Thus, the increase in
poverty and the decrease in median incomes in areas where the for-
eign born immigrate are consistent with increasing incomes for both
natives and immigrants. 34
29. See NRC. supra note 10, at 135-53.
30. See Scott. supra note 18, at BI (quoting economist Edward N. Wolff, who observes that
*-[f]or every investment banker, you have one or two delivery men to feed them during their long
working hours" so that "in a sense, the high-income group in the city also creates this low-
income group" in a "symbiotic relationship").
31. George Borjas has attempted a rough calculation of the size of the surplus enjoyed by
natives in the United States as a result of immigration. using a variety of assumptions. See
George J. Borjas. The Economic Benefits from Immigration. J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995. at 3.
5. Assuming a homogeneous supply of labor, for example, Borjas estimates that immigration
into the United States has produced a surplus of $7,000,000 per year. See id. at 7.
32. Unauthorized immigrants from Mexico. for example. have reported receiving wages in the
United States nearly nine times what they receive in Mexico. See Mexvican Deportees Report
Good Treatment. UNI)ED PRESS INT'L. Apr. 21, 1996, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File (reporting that Mexican immigrants received an average of $278 per week in the United
States. compared with $30.81 per week in Mexico).
33. See Howard F. Chang. Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the
Liberalized Movement of Labor. 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371 (1998-99).
34. See Hong. supra note 19. at 1 (quoting demographer Dowell Myers, who states: "Because
there's a high percentage of poor. does that mean you'll become poor if you move to L.A.? No.
... Does it mean the economy is not performing well? No."): Kelley. supra note 20, at t (not-
ing. despite increasing rates of poverty in Ventura County. quality of life may be improving for
the poor immigrant workers who live there): Scott, supra note 18. at BI (quoting economist
Gary Burtless, who notes: "When you have a lot of people entering from the rest of the world.
and many of them enter at the lower rungs of the wage distribution, then you can have a situa-
tion where everyone is prospering and the median income is declining.").
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II. FISCAL EFFECTS OF UNSKILLED IMMIGRATION
Is there any reason for natives to be worried about the influx of
poor immigrants and the resulting increase in inequality in the United
States? Are natives better off when unskilled workers immigrate?
The answer depends on not only effects on the private sector through
the labor market but also effects on the public sector through taxes
and public entitlements. Much of the debate over the effects of immi-
gration upon the welfare of natives has focused on the question of
whether immigrants pay more in taxes than they consume in public
benefits. 35
The Census Bureau reports that the foreign born not only have
higher rates of poverty but also are more likely to participate in
means-tested programs than natives. While 21.2% of households
headed by foreign-born householders received food stamps, housing
assistance, or Medicaid benefits, only 14.6% of households headed by
natives participated in one of those programs. 36 Similarly, while 8.0%
of households headed by foreign-born householders received Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families, General Assistance, or Supple-
mental Security Income, only 5.6% of native-headed households
participated in one of those programs. 37
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that unskilled immi-
grants on average have a net negative impact on natives through their
effects on the public treasury. The National Research Council (NRC),
for example, found in 1996 that the average immigrant with less than a
high-school education imposed a net fiscal cost of $13,000, even after
taking into account the fiscal benefits that the immigrant's descend-
ants would confer in the future. 38 Does this negative fiscal impact sug-
gest that we should exclude unskilled aliens through restrictive
immigration laws?
A better alternative from the perspective of the economic welfare
of natives would be to admit unskilled aliens to our labor market with-
out granting full access to public benefits. That is, the optimal re-
sponse to fiscal concerns would not be exclusion but less restrictive
alternatives designed to eliminate the fiscal burden that these immi-
grants impose on natives. That is, if unskilled immigrants have a nega-
tive effect on the public sector, the optimal response is not restrictive
immigration laws. Rather, the appropriate response is fiscal. Restric-
35. See, e.g.. CAMAROTA. supra note 17. at 35-41. 53-54: NRC, supra note 10, at 254-362.
36. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. supra note 2, at 48-49.
37. See id.
38. See NRC. supra note 10, at 334 tbl.7.5 (reporting net present value of average fiscal im-
pacts in 1996 dollars).
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tions on alien access to public benefits, for example, can improve the
fiscal impact of immigration without excluding unskilled immigrants
from the U.S. labor force. Exclusion is the more costly response for
both natives and immigrants, because it excludes immigrants not only
from our public benefits but also from our labor market and thereby
sacrifices the gains from trade that we and they would otherwise
enjoy.
The objective of reducing the burden that immigrants impose on
natives through the public sector underlies restrictions on the access
of aliens to various entitlement programs. Current U.S. laws, for ex-
ample, generally exclude non-immigrants, including temporary work-
ers, and unauthorized immigrants from a broad range of public
benefits: with only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for
"any Federal public benefit. ' '39 Current law also includes restrictions
on the access of other aliens, including even legal permanent re-
sidents, to federal entitlement programs. 40 The NRC estimated that
by excluding legal immigrants from various means-tested benefits for
their first five years in the United States, welfare legislation enacted in
1996 would improve the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant
by $8000.41
While legal immigrants can gain full access to public benefits upon
naturalization, only aliens "admitted for permanent residence" may
naturalize as U.S. citizens.42 Aliens admitted on non-immigrant visas
only, including temporary guest workers, are not admitted as perma-
nent residents and are thus not eligible for most public entitlements
and not eligible to naturalize. Therefore, even if fiscal concerns justify
restrictions on access to permanent residence for unskilled workers,
these concerns cannot justify restrictions on their access to non-immi-
grant visas. A truly temporary worker, for example, would remain in
the United States only while employed and would then return home,
imposing even less of a burden on the public treasury than a perma-
nent resident.43 The empirical evidence indicates that immigrants are
likely to make a positive contribution to the public treasury through
the taxes they pay during their working years and impose a burden
only if they remain in the United States for their retirement years and
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000).
40. See id. §§ 1612. 1613.
41. See NRC, supra note 10, at 339 (reporting net present value of fiscal impact in 1996
dollars).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000).
43. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey
with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 158, 189 (Warren F. Schwartz ed..
1995).
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gain access to public benefits.44 Thus, guest workers admitted on non-
immigrant visas, even if unskilled, are likely to have a net positive
economic impact on natives, and there is little reason to restrict their
entry. This observation suggests that the optimal policy from the per-
spective of native economic welfare is to admit unskilled workers as
guest workers rather than exclude them. Through guest-worker pro-
grams, natives enjoy the benefits of unskilled alien workers in the la-
bor market but do not bear the fiscal burden of providing the full set
of public benefits that these workers would enjoy if they were to gain
access to permanent residence and ultimately citizenship.
III. GUEST WORKERS AND LIBERAL EGALITARIAN IDEALS
In fact, the expansion of our guest-worker programs appeared to be
a priority on the political agenda while President George W. Bush
weighed proposals to expand access to such visas, 45 until terrorist at-
tacks placed these plans on hold.46 The question is hardly moot, how-
ever, and we may see some liberalizing reforms proposed in the near
future, now that the Bush administration has resumed negotiations
with Mexico on immigration policy with the support of Democrats in
Congress.47 Should we expand our guest-worker programs?
The alternative to a guest-worker program for many migrant work-
ers is probably entry as an unauthorized immigrant. In fact, employ-
ment-based immigration of unskilled workers into the United States
has largely taken the form of illegal rather than legal immigration.
Legalization of unauthorized immigrants through an expanded guest-
worker program would serve the interests of these immigrants. These
workers would gain from having a legal alternative to illegal entry and
life as an unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them vulnerable to
deportation by the government and to abuse by employers.
Critics of guest-worker programs commonly complain that guest
workers often prefer to stay permanently and that it can be difficult to
ensure that these workers leave.48 We could accommodate the desire
44. See NRC. supra note 10, at 315 fig.7.9.
45. See Dan Eggen & Helen Dewar, Bush Weighing Plan for Mexican Guest Workers, WASH.
PosT. July 25. 2001. at A3.
46. See Alfredo Corchado. Immigration Talks Between U.S., Mexico on Hold, DALLAS MORN-
INCi NEWS, Sept. 19. 2001. at 5A: Mike Doming. Mexico Border Issue on Hold. CHI. TRIB.. Sept.
21. 2001. at 16.
47. See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, U.S. and Mexico to Resume Talks on Inmigration
Policy. WASH. Posr, Nov. 15. 20(11. at A40: Ginger Thompson. Top Democrats Politick Through
Rural Mexico. N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 19, 2(101, at A12.
48. See Philip L. Martin & Michael S. Teitelbaum. The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers.
FOREIGN AFF.. Nov./Dec. 2001. at 117. 119-20. 124-25.
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of guest workers to remain here by lifting restrictions on the duration
of a guest worker's residence and employment in the United States.
As long as we restrict their access to public benefits for a sufficient
period of time, they seem unlikely to impose a net fiscal burden on
natives. 49
Such a program, however, raises the prospect of de facto permanent
residents with only restricted access to citizenship and to public bene-
fits. 50 Liberal objections to this prospect account for some of the po-
litical resistance to expansion of these guest-worker programs. James
Woodward objects that "[t]he creation of a class of permanent re-
sidents who are restricted from becoming citizens (if they should wish
to do so) or any similar system of differential status among a state's
permanent inhabitants is fundamentally incompatible with liberal
egalitarian ideals."5'
For example, consider the liberal theory of justice developed by
John Rawls, who asks what principles people would choose behind a
"veil of ignorance. ' '52 In this "original position," people know nothing
about their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "they do not
know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case
and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of gen-
eral considerations. '5 3 This condition ensures that the parties are
"fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons. '5 4 Rawls in-
cludes all persons within a single society, which he defines as "a coop-
erative venture for mutual advantage," as participants in the original
position.5 5  Rawls concludes that principles of distributive justice
49. Recall that the NRC found that an immigrant with less than a high-school education im-
poses a net fiscal cost of only $13.000. and that if the 1996 welfare legislation excludes immi-
grants from seven specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in the United
States. then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant would improve by $8000. See NRC.
supra note 10. at 334. 339.
50. See Sergio Munoz. Jorge Castaneda: Mexico's Man Abroad. L.A. TIMES. Aug. 12. 2001. at
M3.
51. James Woodward, Commentary: Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL
ISSUES IN THF TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59. 82 (Brian Barry &
Robert E. Goodin eds.. 1992). The communitarian Michael Walzer adopts a similar position.
See MICHAEL WALZER. SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSF OF PLURALISM AND EOUALITY 56-61
(1983) (arguing that guest-worker programs are inconsistent with political justice in a democratic
state).
52. See JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
53. Id. at 136-37: see also id. at 141 (-If a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the out-
come is biased by arbitrary contingencies.").
54. 1d. at 141.
55. /d. at 4.
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would require members of this society to maximize the welfare of
those who are least advantaged. 56
Thus, liberal ideals suggest that our obligations of distributive jus-
tice extend to workers who participate in a scheme of social coopera-
tion with us. From this perspective, we cannot limit these obligations
to natives alone. This perspective suggests that if we admit workers to
our labor market, we must extend the benefits of full membership to
them as well. From this perspective, by admitting unskilled workers,
we make them objects of our concern and thus worthy recipients of
the full set of public benefits that we provide to natives. We would
then take a broader view of national economic welfare: our welfare
objectives would include the welfare of not only natives but also
immigrants. 57
IV. THE IMMIGRATION PARADOX
By the same token, however, by excluding aliens from our labor
market and our society, we can avoid the obligations that we would
incur by admitting them. Rawls assumes that the "boundaries" of his
principles "are given by the notion of a self-contained national com-
munity. s5 8 Similarly, Woodward argues in favor of applying Rawls's
framework to "inhabitants of a particular country" and rejects the
suggestion that Rawls's principles of justice apply "globally." 59
This moral stance, however, produces an anomaly. If our admission
policies are based only on the interests of natives and immigrants al-
ready here, then we would refuse to admit poor immigrants because
we would anticipate the public benefits that they would consume and
the fiscal burden that they would impose on incumbent residents.
Thus, our commitment to treat them as equals once admitted would
cut against their admission and make them worse off than they would
be if we rejected such a commitment. That is, by agreeing to obliga-
tions of distributive justice toward them if admitted, we harm them.
These aliens would be better off if we agreed never to care about their
welfare and never to treat them as equals. If concern for the welfare
of poor immigrants motivates generous fiscal policies toward them,
then it seems perverse to cite these policies as a reason to exclude the
56. See id. at 75-83.
57. See Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan. On the Choice Between Capital and Labor
Mobility. 14 J. INT'L ECON. 209. 212 (1983) ([O]nce labour crosses national borders, we have to
worry about which country's welfare it ought to be included in .... [W]e need to consider the
possibility that it may be regarded, after immigration, to be part of one's own welfare.").
58. RAWLS. supra note 52. at 457.
59. Woodward. supra note 51. at 75: see also id. at 75-81.
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very immigrants whose welfare we would seek to improve through
these policies. This moral stance is unsatisfactory from the standpoint
of human welfare. The liberal who prevents a poor alien from escap-
ing extreme poverty while citing principles of justice and equality for
that alien seems vulnerable to the charge of "superstitious 'rule wor-
ship,'" that is, "the charge of heartlessness, in his apparently prefer-
ring abstract conformity to a rule to the prevention of avoidable
human suffering. '60
It seems incoherent public policy to turn away the poor immigrant,
citing a negative effect on the welfare of current residents, given that
we always have the option of admitting the poor immigrant subject to
restrictions on access to public benefits. This option would improve
the welfare of both the poor immigrant and the welfare of current
residents. This admission would also transform the poor immigrant
into a resident, however, and if our social welfare criterion includes
the welfare of all residents, then the same distributive concerns that
justified generous policies for other poor residents would apply to the
poor immigrant as well. In short, no measure of social welfare that
counts an individual's welfare if and only if the individual is a resident
can provide a coherent criterion for immigration policies, because
these policies determine the identity of the population of residents.
This moral stance harms the very individuals whose welfare we
would invoke as the basis for their access to citizenship and public
benefits. This paradox lies at the heart of immigration policy. A com-
mitment to treat the immigrant as an equal can backfire against the
alien seeking to immigrate, because the immigrant's access to this
equal status does not arise unless we admit the immigrant. If the act
of admission triggers obligations of justice, then we can avoid these
obligations by choosing to exclude. Indeed, if admission polices are
determined by the interests of only incumbent residents, we would be
obliged to exclude unskilled alien workers. This stance begs the ques-
tion of whether we can legitimately base admission policies on the
interests of incumbent residents alone.
Unless the admission decision itself also respects the alien as an
equal, the result is perverse. Thus, the source of the immigration par-
adox is the contingent nature of the obligation to treat the alien as an
equal. That is, this problem is inherent in making obligations of jus-
tice contingent on voluntary acts of cooperation. This approach al-
lows us to avoid obligations of justice by refusing to employ poor
60. J.C. Smart. An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD
WiIIAMS. UTIITARIANiSM: FOR AND AGAINS-r 3. 6 (1973).
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aliens. If we refuse to admit aliens, then we owe them no explanation
within the framework that Rawls proposes for deriving principles of
justice. This approach reconciles the exclusion of aliens with egalita-
rian principles of social justice only by fiat: it assumes the result rather
than deriving it.61
We cannot begin our normative analysis by assuming that we do not
admit the aliens in question. As the example of immigration policy
demonstrates, the question of which individuals we choose as partners
in cooperation is itself an open question of public policy that we may
want to answer using our principles of justice. If we make obligations
of justice contingent on whether we admit them in the first place, then
this normative framework becomes a function of our policies and can-
not work as an independent standard that we can use to evaluate
these policies.
That is, if admission to our labor market implies status as a constitu-
ent and as a member of our society, then the set of individuals whose
welfare we seek to promote becomes an endogenous function of our
admission policies. By choosing our members, we also choose our
moral obligations and our welfare objectives. If our obligations de-
pend on our admission policies, however, then they can no longer pro-
vide independent criteria for a normative analysis of those admission
policies. Our analysis becomes circular: we are justified in discrimi-
nating against aliens in employment precisely because our refusal to
hire them relieves us of the obligations of justice that we would owe
equals. Such a theory begs the question of whether our choice of part-
ners is itself justifiable. 62
V. COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM
We can avoid the immigration paradox if we instead adopt a welfare
objective that is independent of our policy choices. Two options pre-
sent themselves. First, we can choose a welfare objective that favors
the interests of natives and discounts the interests of immigrants. As
we saw, this nativist perspective suggests guest-worker programs as
61. Thus, critics of this approach complain that it is "an arbitrary move which cannot be de-
fended within the theory." BRIAN BARRY. THE LIBERAL TI-IEORY OF JUIJC-icE 129 (1973).
62. Thus, the fact that cooperation is feasible should be sufficient to require the inclusion of a
prospective party to the original position. See Charles R. Beitz. Cosmopolitan Ideals and Na-
tional Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 595 (1983) (arguing that otherwise. "limiting the scope of the
principles to national societies on the grounds that international cooperation does not exist to-
day . . . would arbitrarily favor the status quo").
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the optimal immigration policies for unskilled aliens.63 Second, we
can adopt a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal concern to
all individuals, including aliens. Either alternative provides a criterion
that is independent of our admission policies and thus avoids the cir-
cularity that underlies the immigration paradox. The welfare objec-
tive that is consistent with liberal egalitarian ideals, however, is
cosmopolitan rather than nativist.
Only the cosmopolitan interpretation of the original position offers
a satisfactory framework for the evaluation of our immigration poli-
cies under a liberal egalitarian theory of justice. This cosmopolitan
perspective is the only interpretation of the original position that is
faithful to "the underlying spirit of Rawls' theory," which "is animated
by the underlying idea of eliminating or compensating for 'morally
arbitrary' differences between people."' 64 Cosmopolitan liberals note
that "the fact that one is an inhabitant of one particular country rather
than another . . . is a paradigmatic example of the sort of 'morally
arbitrary' fact that the method of the original position is designed to
abstract from." 65 To restrict the scope of our theory of justice based
on such morally arbitrary facts undermines our claim to a liberal egali-
tarian theory of justice.
The cosmopolitan perspective would imply not only more generous
transfer policies but also more liberal admission policies for unskilled
immigrants than the nativist perspective would imply.66 Joseph
Carens addresses the issue of immigration restrictions as a question of
social justice using a cosmopolitan interpretation of Rawls's original
position. 67 In seeking a justification for the exclusion of aliens, he sug-
gests, "we don't want to be biased by self-interested or partisan con-
siderations" and instead "can take it as a basic presupposition that we
should treat all human beings, not just members of our own society, as
free and equal moral persons. '68 Carens identifies this premise as a
63. 1 use the term -nativist" here to refer to "the practice or policy of favoring native-born
citizens as against immigrants." WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LAN
IACE 947 (David B. Guralnik ed.. 1976).
64. Woodward. supra note 51, at 80-81. In this sense, Rawls's failure to extend his principles
globally is "an ad hoc move" that is "inconsistent with the underlying egalitarian spirit of his
theory." Id. at 76.
65. Id. at 76.
66. See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the
Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147. 1229-38 (1997).
67. See Joseph H. Carens. Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders. 49 REV. POL. 251.
255 (1987).
68. Id. at 256.
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basic feature of all liberal political theories, 69 concluding that we
should "take a global, not a national, view of the original position. '70
If we begin with equal concern for all persons, then immigration
barriers are morally suspect and demand justification. All immigra-
tion restrictions discriminate against individuals based on their alien-
age. Most aliens are born aliens because our nationality laws deem
them to be aliens based on immutable characteristics, including the
geographic location of their birth (that is, national origin) and the citi-
zenship of their parents at the time of their birth. 71 For a liberal soci-
ety that declares that "all men are created equal," 72 this discrimination
based explicitly on circumstances of birth is at odds with ideal princi-
ples of social justice.73 National origin would appear to be a trait that
Rawls should deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view."'74 Carens
concludes that we cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds that
those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens
were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born else-
where or of alien parents. ' 75 Nor can we justify restrictions "on the
grounds that immigration would reduce the economic well-being of
current citizens."'76 Similarly, in a utilitarian calculation of global wel-
fare, "current citizens would enjoy no privileged position.' ' 77 Carens
and others conclude from these liberal premises that "we have an obli-
gation to open our borders much more fully than we do now."'78
69. See id. at 265 (claiming that "our social institutions and public policies must respect all
human beings as moral persons," which "entails recognition ... of the freedom and equality of
everv human being"): see also id. at 269 ("No moral argument will seem acceptable ...if it
directly challenges the assumption of the equal moral worth of all individuals.").
70. Id. at 256.
71. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born ... in the United States. and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... ): 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000) (setting
forth categories of "citizens of the United States at birth").
72. THE DECLARAION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
73. See Howard F. Chang, hnmigration Polic. Liberal Principles. and the Republican Tradi-
tion. 85 GEO. L.J. 2115, 2112-15 (1997): Roger Nett. The Civil Rig/it We Are Not Readiy For: 7ie
Right of Free Movement of People on the Face of the Earth. 81 Eri ncs 212. 224 (1971) ("May we
expect the lesson which the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportu-
nities to be repeated on a broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding 'deseg-
regation' of nation states'?").
74. RAWLS. supra note 52. at 72.
75. Carens. supra note 67. at 261.
76. Id. at 262.
77. Id. at 263 ("[T]he utilitarian commitment to moral equality is reflected in the assumption
that everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when utility is calculated.").
78. Id. at 270. Carens condemns immigration restrictions: "Like feudal barriers to mobility.
they protect unjust privilege." Id. Similarly. Bruce Ackerman concludes that immigration barri-
ers are inconsistent with liberal principles: "I cannot justify my power to exclude you without
destroying my own claim to membership in an ideal liberal state." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN. So
CIAL JIJSTlICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93 (1980).
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VI. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AND SECOND-BEST POLICIES
Given the failure of most citizens to adopt this cosmopolitan per-
spective, however, cosmopolitan liberals face a constraint of political
feasibility that prevents realization of all their ideals. As a matter of
political reality, the interests of citizens have in fact played a dominant
role in the public debate over immigration policies. National govern-
ments, including that of the United States, will likely continue to deem
the promotion of its own citizens as the paramount objective of immi-
gration policies. 79 This feature of the real world may impose a con-
straint on the set of policy alternatives open to us as a practical
matter.8 0
The cosmopolitan liberal would prefer that aliens have access both
to our labor market and to public benefits and citizenship. As a mat-
ter of political reality, however, incumbent citizens are unlikely to ad-
mit unskilled aliens under those generous conditions in the numbers
that cosmopolitan ideals would require, given the fiscal burden that
those liberal policies would entail. As long as citizens are limited in
their willingness to bear this burden, they are likely to restrict alien
access to immigrant visas.
The self-interest of citizens is bound to impose constraints of politi-
cal feasibility on the availability of immigrant visas. These constraints
are likely to exclude many unskilled aliens from the U.S. labor market
unless they either are willing to immigrate illegally or have access to
guest-worker visas. Given these constraints, cosmopolitan liberals
face a trade-off: significantly liberalized access to our labor markets
for unskilled alien workers will likely require some restrictions on ac-
cess to public benefits and citizenship to have a realistic chance of
enactment.81 Under these circumstances, guest-worker programs may
represent the only alternative to exclusion for many aliens.
79. See, e.g.. S. REP. No. 98-62, at 3-4 (1983) ("[T]he paramount obligation of any nation's
government, indeed the very reason for its existence and the justification for its power, is to
promote the national interest-the long-term welfare of the majority of its citizens and their
descendants.").
80. See Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the Border, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION,
supra note 43. at 136, 140 (noting that the limitations imposed by "bounded caring" are, "like it
or not.... facts that exist in the world" and "unlikely to change more than marginally in the near
future," so that any "real-world immigration policy must ... take account of these facts and work
around them").
81. Recognizing the political controversy generated by proposals to grant access to citizen-
ship, Mexico has also emphasized an expanded guest-worker program in its negotiations with the
Bush administration and has been careful not to press the issue of citizenship. By maintaining
flexibility on this issue, Mexico seeks, as the Mexican foreign minister Jorge Castaneda put it, "as
many rights as possible, for as many Mexicans (in the United States) as pe-sible, as soon as
possible" within the constraints of political feasibility. Robert Collier, Momet ,urn Grows to Le-
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If so, cosmopolitan liberals must settle for second-best policies that
fall short of their ideals. For many unskilled alien workers, legaliza-
tion as guest workers may be the best one can achieve under current
circumstances. Guest-worker programs may be incompatible with lib-
eral egalitarian ideals, as Woodward notes, but as Carens and others
have argued, the exclusion of aliens is also incompatible with these
ideals. If political realities require us to choose between these two
departures from our liberal egalitarian ideals, then how can Wood-
ward justify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the alien as
well as on natives? 82
Ironically, Woodward himself notes that if we act against a "back-
ground of non-ideal institutions and behaviour" in a world "in which
large numbers of people and institutions fail to do what justice re-
quires," we may "acquire obligations which are different from those
[we] would acquire under more perfectly just institutional arrange-
ments. 8s3 As Woodward states the theory of the second-best:
It is not in general a defensible moral principle that if it is obligatory
(or even a good thing) to do P under ideal, utopian circumstances,
then it is also obligatory (or even a good thing) to do P under the
actual circumstances, no matter how far they may differ from the
ideal.8 4
Woodward advances this claim in defense of immigration restrictions,
but as we have seen, they could more plausibly justify restrictions on
alien access to public benefits and to citizenship. Indeed, Woodward
himself notes that "it is far from obvious that it would be wrong ... to
limit eligibility for social welfare programmes to citizens or long-term
residents, if failure to do so would jeopardize the continued existence
of such programmes. 81 5 We might say the same about restrictions on
alien access to public benefits and citizenship if these restrictions are
necessary to make politically feasible the alien's access to our labor
market and the alien's admission in the first place.
galiZe Migrants. S.F. CIRON.. July 16. 2001. at Al. As one Mexican negotiator explained. "we
* . .have to be verv realistic." Alfredo Corchado. Fox Pushes for a More Open Border, DAI-LAS
MORNING NEWS. July 16. 2001, at IA. Castaneda has explained that access to citizenship "is not
something of huge significance to us." Munoz. supra note 50. at M3.
82. See JULIAN L. SIMON. THE ECONOMIC CONSEOUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 302-03. 310
(1989) (arguing that a guest-worker program is better than a policy of exclusion): see also Seid-
man, supra note 80. at 143 ('Why should anyone believe that a guest worker is 'exploited' when
he receives higher wages and more protection in the program than he would receive if he re-
mained in his home country'?").
83. Woodward, supra note 51, at 78.
84. Id. at 77.
85. Id. at 79.
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These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal al-
ternatives, both of which fall short of our moral ideals. In this regard,
teleological moral theories have an advantage over deontological the-
ories. Under a teleological theory, "those institutions and acts are
right which of the available alternatives produce the most good."'86
Once we specify the good, then a teleological theory can provide a
complete ranking of all alternatives, including non-ideal alternatives.8 7
Deontological theories, which do not maximize a good specified in
advance,88  may not readily provide a ranking of non-ideal
alternatives.8 9
We might, for example, specify the good as an appropriate measure
of social welfare, one based on the satisfaction of preferences but ex-
cluding those preferences that violate our liberal principles of equal-
ity. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has proposed such a teleological
theory.90 If we apply this type of consequentialism and adopt a cos-
mopolitan perspective, then a guest-worker program represents the
lesser of two evils when compared with the alternative of exclusion.
Exclusion not only decreases global wealth but also worsens its distri-
bution, whereas a guest-worker program would improve social welfare
on both counts by increasing labor mobility. 91
Thus, from a consequentialist perspective that extends equal con-
cern to aliens and natives, expanded guest-worker programs represent
an improvement over the status quo alternative of exclusion. There-
fore, cosmopolitan liberals should support liberalizing reforms that in-
clude guest-worker programs, even while seeking the broadest rights
possible for aliens within the constraints of political feasibility. While
it would be a mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a
liberal egalitarian perspective, it would also be a mistake to sacrifice
worthwhile reforms because they fall short of the ideal.
86. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 24.
87. See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE. WELFARE ECONOMICS 34 (1984) (defining a "com-
plete" ordering): JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN. THEORY OF GAMES AND Eco-
NOMIcI BEHAVIOR 26 (3d ed. 1953) (same).
88. See RAWLS. supra note 52, at 30.
89. See id. al 303 (suggesting that "we may be able to find no satisfactory answer at all" in
"instances of nonideal theory").
90. See RONALD DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234-38 (1977). 1 have outlined a sim-
ilar theory. which I call "liberal consequentialism." See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of
Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle. 110 YALE L.J. 173. 195-96 (2000).
91. See Bob Hamilton & John Whallev. Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global
Restrictions on Labour Mobility. 14 J. DEv. ECON. 61, 70-74 (1984).
[Vol. 52:759
